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Abstract 
This paper uses data from the British Household Panel Survey and the Attitudes to 
Inheritances Survey to estimate the magnitude of and the factors that are correlated 
with private inter-household transfers from parents to their adult children in the UK. 
Our evidence suggests that inter vivos transfers in the UK are fairly common although 
regular financial transfers may be less so. AIS suggests an aggregate value of all gifts 
received so far in people’s lifetimes of around £83 billion in 2004.  This is about one 
tenth of the aggregate value of inheritances reported to the same survey, or about 2.3 
per cent of total wealth at the time.  One section of BHPS implies an annual flow of 
parental transfers of only around £1.1 billion, or 4 per cent of the flow of inheritances, 
but other parts of the same survey imply a much greater prevalence of transfers. It 
appears that none of the available datasets captures the whole picture.  Consistently, 
however, the surveys suggest that financial transfers are negatively associated with 
age and the income of the recipient indicating that parental transfers are reach children 
when help is most needed, and most for those with greater needs.  However, it is the 
parents with greater resources who are able to do this, meaning that the process tends 
to reinforce intergenerational links. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper investigates the magnitude and the correlates of parental inter vivos 
transfers in the UK. This issue is important for a number of reasons. First, inter vivos 
transfers are an important way by which families can redistribute resources across 
their members and may be a significant source of inequality and of the 
intergenerational transmission of inequality. Moreover, parental financial transfers 
may influence the effectiveness of government redistribution policies by interacting 
with publicly provided transfers (Barro 1974; Becker 1974; Cox and Jakubson 1995; 
Kotlikoff et al. 1990; Bernheim and Bagwell, 1988; Altonji et al.1992). Finally, to the 
extent that family transfers represent a significant motive for savings they may be a 
significant determinant of savings behaviour and therefore a significant driver of 
wealth accumulation and national savings rates.  
 
For the US, Gale and Scholz (1994) estimate that the annual flows of parental inter 
vivos transfers in 1986 was $67 billion and that inter vivos gifts account for about 20 
per cent of total wealth accumulation. More recent estimates by Wolff suggest that 
among households who had received a transfer by 2007, about 10 per cent of the value 
of these transfers had come from gifts and another 10 per cent from trust funds (Wolff, 
2011). For France, evidence from estate duty statistics indicates that the total amount 
of (declared) inter vivos transfers accounts each year for approximately one third of 
the total amount of declared inheritances (Pestieau, 2002). In 1970s, the Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (1977) in the UK suggested 
that lifetimes gifts were just over a fifth of the scale of inherited wealth, accounting 
for about 4.4 per cent of total wealth compared to 20.3 per cent accounted for by 
inheritances.  
 
Although financial transfers are probably one of the most direct ways by which 
parents can support their children, they are not the only ones. An enlarged conception 
of parental transfers would also include transfers provided in context of co-residence 
and/or time transfers. As stressed by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), ignoring 
transfers provided via or in the context of co-residence ignoring household living 
arrangements among young adults, many of whom are engaged in human capital 
investment activities, gives a misleading picture of appropriate life-cycle resource 
constraints and of the extent of intergenerational financial support for these 
investments. As shown by Altonji et al. (1996) and Shoeni (1997) time transfers are 
very common and flow both from children to their parents but also from parents to 
their children.     
 
Despite the importance of studying inter vivos transfers there has been very limited 
information on this behaviour in the UK (with the notable exception of the US similar 
limitations exist worldwide). The objective of this paper is to provide estimates of the 
prevalence and the magnitude of different types of parental inter vivos transfers (cash-
transfers, time transfers and co-residence) in the UK and to analyse the determinants 
of these different types of support. Our empirical analysis synthesizes data from the 
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British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the Attitudes to Inheritance Survey 
(AIS) to provide some preliminary evidence on the scale and the factors associated 
with parental transfers.  Despite their many limitations BHPS and AIS provide 
valuable starting points for analysing transfers behaviour and for uncovering the 
motivations and the drivers of parental giving behaviour in the UK.  
 
The paper begins with a general discussion of the main models of transfer behaviour, 
their distributional effects and a summary of findings from previous studies (which 
mainly document findings from the US). The subsequent sections describe the data 
sources used in our analysis (section 3) and the results based on these data (sections 4 
and 5). A concluding section synthesises our findings and discusses their implications 
for the intergenerational transmission of inequality.   
 
2. Models of intergenerational transfers  
One issue which attracted considerable attention in the relevant literature is the 
motivation behind parental transfers. The two most widely cited explanations of 
transfer motives are altruism and exchange. Under the altruism model, parents’ utility 
is directly linked to their children’s utility (Barro 1974; Becker 1974). The main 
prediction of the altruistic model is that transfers are negatively related to the income 
of their children and positively related to the income of the parents (Becker 1981). 
Under the exchange model, on the other hand, inter vivos transfers and bequests (Cox, 
1987; Bernheim et al., 1985; Cox and Rank, 1992; Cox and Jakubson, 1995) are form 
of exchange and represent payments to children  for the potential reciprocal provision 
of services (time help, attention, companionship, visits etc). With the exchange model 
the amount of parental transfers is positively related to parental income (since higher 
income will buy more services from children) while it may be either positively or 
negatively related to children’s income. An alternative model is the ‘warm glow’ 
model (Andreoni, 1989). Under this model parents may get utility from the amount of 
the transfers they give to their children (joy of giving) but not from the utility their 
children derive from these transfers. Therefore the main prediction of this therefore is 
that the amount of the transfer may be independent of the characteristics of the 
children.  
 
Other models of transfer behaviour are the insurance and the access to credit market 
models. Under the former, parental transfers are used to smooth consumption across 
time (insuring against children’s income fluctuations) while under the latter parental 
transfers may substitute for credit markets and provide money transfers when current 
income of their children is below their future income and the children have no assets. 
  
A growing body of empirical research (mainly from the US) examines the relationship 
between the size of the transfer and the recipient's and donor's income in an effort to 
shed light on the motivation behind inter-household transfers and to understand their 
distributional effects. Since all models predict that the amount of the transfers 
increases with parents’ income, the main test of inter-households transfers models has 
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been to examine the direction of the relationship between the size of the transfer and 
recipient’s income. As our brief discussion above highlighted, the altruism model is 
consistent with a negative income effect while the exchange model is consistent with 
either a negative, positive or negative effects. Although some studies found a positive 
income effects (Cox, 1987; Cox and Rank, 1992) – behaviour which is inconsistent 
with the altruistic model and suggests that parents give more to their better off 
children – most empirical studies have found that the children’s income has a negative 
effect on the amount of transfers received from the parents, consistent with the 
altruism (Altonji et al, 1997; McGarry and Schoeni 1995, 1997). However in most of 
these studies the estimated impact of the change in income on the amount of transfers 
is much lower than the one predicted by the pure altruistic theory. In contrast to the 
consistent negative relationship between recipients’ income and transfer amount, most 
studies have found that bequests are divided equally across siblings, regardless of their 
incomes (Menchik, 1980, 1988; McGarry, 1999; Light and McGarry, 2004).  
 
3. Data 
The data that I use in this paper come from the Attitudes to Inheritance Survey (AIS) 
and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The AIS is a specialised nationally 
representative survey of more than 2,000 individuals which was conducted in 2004 by 
researchers from Bristol and Bath universities in order to study the importance of 
inheritances and inheritance intentions.
1
 Although inter vivos transfers were not the 
direct focus of the survey, some basic information was collected. The specific 
question regarding inter vivos transfers contained in AIS asks respondents to specify 
whether they or their spouses have ever received a lifetime gift exceeding £500 and 
the reason for the gift. Possible reasons included: cash to spend, a wedding or large 
social occasion, buying a car, buying or maintaining a property, education, paying for 
driving lessons, birth of children, paying off debts, paying for holiday or other luxury, 
general living expenses, business start-up and any other type of gift. Respondents who 
reported that they (or their spouses in the cases of married people) had received inter 
vivos transfers had to specify the total value of all gifts that they have ever received, 
the relationship with the donor and the age at which the last gift was received. 
 
On the basis of the total value of all gifts and the age at receipt of the last gift (which 
effectively provides an upper estimate of the average date of receipt) we can compute 
the value of all gifts ever received by the respondents (and their spouses) as of the 
survey year. Using the Retail Price Index we convert the total value of lifetime gifts 
ever received by respondents to 2005 pounds. In computing the value of inter vivos 
gifts we had to address several methodological issues. First, because the total value of 
                                              
1
  Although the original sample design in AIS was designed as a regionally stratified, clustered 
sample due to difficulties with the random sampling method halfway of the survey the 
sampling strategy was switched to a quota design. Overall, about 50 percent of the cases were 
based on random sampling and 50 percent on quota sampling (Rowlingson and McKay, 
2005). 
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inter-vivos gifts is recorded in bands we assigned the mid-point value of the band.
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Secondly, because the survey records the age at which the last gift was received and 
not the age of each gift separately when we uprate the total value of all gifts we had to 
adjust all gifts for inflation since the date of the receipt of last gift. Therefore the value 
of gifts received earlier than the last gift (and which would be included in the total 
value of all gifts) would be underestimated (and in some cases seriously). 
Furthermore, because the age of receipt is recorded in 10 year bands we had to assume 
that the receipt took place at the mid age of the age specific band.  Given that the 
reported value of gifts includes all gifts received by the respondent (and/or his spouse 
in the case of married couples) to derive an estimate of individual receipts we assume 
that both the respondent and his spouse received gifts of equal value (i.e. if respondent 
is married we divide reported gifts by two).  
  
The second dataset we use is the British Household Survey (BHPS), an annual panel 
survey of about 5,000 households (10,000 individuals) which is conducted 
continuously since 1991. For our analysis we compile evidence from three different 
sections of the BHPS questionnaire. First, we use data from the ‘household finances’ 
section which collects income and payments data for each household member. The 
specific question from this section which forms the basis of our analysis asks 
respondents whether they received any transfers from non-resident family members in 
the last year prior the survey and to specify the value of these transfers. These data are 
recorded continuously from wave one onwards.  
 
Secondly, we use data from a series of questions included in waves 11 and 16 as part 
of ‘social support network’ module  with the aim to explore the links across 
households. As part of these questions respondents were asked about the kinds of help 
provided for and received from, adult children and parents who are not living in 
respondents household (see Appendix A). This yielded four sets of data: support for 
adult children, support for parents, support from adult children and support from 
parents. Given the focus in this paper, we focus on data on support for adult children 
and support from parents. The question about help from parents asked respondents: 
‘And do you regularly or frequently receive any of the things listed on this card from 
your parents not living here?’ The types of support specified by the survey included: 
getting lifts in their car; shopping for you; providing or cooking meals; looking after 
your children; washing, ironing or cleaning; dealing with personal affairs e.g. paying 
bills; writing letters; decorating, gardening or house repairs; financial help; anything 
else. In our analysis we examine financial help separately from all the other types of 
support (which we group into one category which we term practical support).  
 
A similar question is used to assess the extent to which parents provide support for 
their children. The specific question for support provided to non-resident children asks 
respondents: ‘Nowadays, do you regularly or frequently do any of the things listed on 
this card for your children who are not living here?’. Again the types of support 
                                              
2
  In the top band (open ended) we set the value of the transfer at the minimum value of the 
open band (i.e. £50,000).  
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specified by the question included financial help as well as different types of practical 
support (similar to those listed above).   
 
In addition to the above, in each wave BHPS asks respondents to report whether they 
made ‘external transfers’ to any non-resident children and the reason for these 
transfers (as part of more general questions of external transfer to any non-resident 
persons). Respondents were prompted to consider five types of payments: 
maintenance, alimony and child support; educational payment; spending money or 
allowance; debt repayment; and other kinds of payment (but excluding pocket money 
for children and payments to charity). Although not explicitly stated the survey 
questions seem to imply regular payments rather than one-off sums of money. In our 
analysis we use external transfers data recorded in waves 2-16. 
 
From the brief description above it is clear that each of the different sources captures 
different aspects of parental giving behaviour and it is highly unlikely that any of them 
would provide a complete picture of the total scale of parental inter vivos transfers. 
For example data from the household finances section may be expected to capture 
regular transfers while financial help data from the ‘social support network’ module 
would capture a wider forms of parental support including smaller payments and 
possibly would include loans. Similarly, data from the external transfers section most 
probably captures more regular payments. Furthermore it seems highly unlikely that 
any of the surveys systematically capture life insurance or establishment of trusts 
which could account a substantial share of lifetime transfers of most wealthy. 
Notwithstanding these differences, combining the different sources we can highlight 
different aspects of parental giving behaviour and provide some indication of its 
overall scale. 
 
4.  Patterns of transfers   
In this section we provide estimates of the frequency and the magnitude of inter vivos 
cash transfers, the annual flow of these transfers and we provide evidence on the 
importance of parental practical support and co-residence.   
 
4.1  Inter vivos financial transfers 
LIFETIME CASH TRANSFERS   
We first examine inter vivos transfers based on data from AIS. As discussed above 
AIS provides data on the aggregate value of all transfers ever received by respondents 
and their spouses during their lifetime and up to the survey year (2004). Data are 
recorded for receipts of both the respondent and his/her spouse and therefore can be 
considered as capturing inter vivos transfers at a family unit level.   
 
Table 1 provides information concerning the proportion of respondents who reported 
that they (and/or their spouses) have received inter vivos transfers and the conditional 
mean value of their transfers. Statistics are presented overall and by age group of the 
respondent. As shown in Table 1, about 31 per cent of all respondents aged over 18 
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years old reported inter vivos transfer. The conditional mean value of reported 
transfers was about £10,400.
 3
 Transforming these data to individual receipts (based 
on the assumption that both the respondent and his/her spouse have received gifts of 
equal amounts) gives an estimate of the mean value of inter vivos transfer for each 
adult of about £1,800. This is about 10 per cent of the mean value of inheritances as 
estimated by Karagiannaki (2011) using again data from AIS (about £19,000). 
Although the total received so far is higher for the 55-64 year olds (reflecting the fact 
that they have had more time to receive an inter vivos gift than younger cohorts) the 
proportion of recipients is higher among the 25-34 year olds. This could indicate 
either a lower recall of receipts by later cohorts (particularly the oldest) or the fact that 
younger cohorts are more likely to receive cash transfers than their predecessors.    
 
Aggregating these estimates to national level we find that the total value of lifetime 
inter vivos gifts in 2004 was of the magnitude of about £83 billion (in 2005 prices). 
Comparable estimates for inherited wealth based on AIS suggest that the total value of 
inherited wealth in 2004 amounted to about £700 billion. This lifetime gift total is 
equivalent to about 2.3 per cent of HMRC’s estimates of total marketable wealth for 
2003. This is lower than the comparable 4 per cent estimate for gifts made more than 
seven years before death as estimated by the Royal Commission on the Distribution of 
Income and Wealth for 1973 (1977),
4 
although that may mainly reflect the much 
higher value of personal wealth in relation to income in 2003 than 30 years before.  
 
As shown in Table 2 the most prevalent type of gifts are cash to spend and financial 
assistance for paying a wedding or a large social occasion (each received by 9 per cent 
of respondents or their spouses) followed by gifts for buying and maintaining a 
property, buying a car (each received by 7 per cent). Gifts for education were received 
by 5 per cent of respondents (a similar percentage reported gifts for the birth of a 
child) while gifts for paying-off debts and for business start-up were received by 3 and 
1 percent of respondents respectively. The conditional mean values of total gifts were 
larger among respondents who received gifts for buying or maintaining a property 
(£19,000) and those who received gifts for their education (£17,000) and business 
start-up (£22,000). Recall that the value of gifts in the AIS is recorded for all gifts that 
respondents and their spouses received during their lifetime up to the survey year. 
Given that the majority of recipients receive more than one type of gift (see last 
column in Table 2) the conditional mean by type of gift reflects the value of all gifts 
that respondents received and not only of the specific gift listed in Table 2. Also note 
that more than 80 per cent of respondents who received financial assistance with their 
education and about 70 per cent of those who received assistance with house purchase 
had received another type of gift.  
 
                                              
3
  These figures are comparable to those reported by Rowlingson and McKay (2005) who also 
employ AIS in their analysis. 
4
  The aggregate value of lifetime transfers is calculated by multiplying the mean value of 
lifetime inter vivos transfers (£10,400) by the percentage of inheritors and the total number 
of UK adult population (46.6 million). Total marketable wealth according to HMRC statistics 
in 2003 and 2005 was £4,050 and £5,005 billion respectively.  
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CURRENT CASH TRANSFERS  
In this section we provide evidence on the magnitude of inter vivos cash transfers 
based on data from the income section (which provides data on financial transfers 
from non-resident family members) and the ‘social support network’ module of the 
BHPS (which provides information on financial help from non-resident parents). 
Recall that data from BHPS income section refer to financial transfers from non-
resident family members (not only parents) made in the year preceding the survey 
while data from the ‘social support network’ module refer to regular or frequent 
financial help from non-resident parents (here there is an uncertainty as to the 
reference period of regular or frequent transfers as well as to the interpretation made 
by respondents). Therefore although both set of questions refer to current as opposed 
to lifetime receipts (as in AIS) they appear to be capturing different aspects of parental 
transfers to a varying degree. For example note that while BHPS income section data 
most probably refer to more regular financial transfers, the financial help data from 
the ‘social support network’ module probably refer to a wider form of parental 
transfers including larger one-off payments/gifts (of the nature captured by AIS) as 
well as smaller gifts and possibly loans. Therefore the two data sources may be 
expected to provide different answers about the prevalence and the magnitude of 
annual parental transfers.  
 
Table 3 presents statistics based on these data. All statistics are provided for adults 
aged 18 years old or over as well as by age group. According to data from the income 
section, each year on average 0.9 per cent of adults receive financial transfers from 
family members who live in separate households. The conditional mean value of these 
transfers was about £2,600 (in 2005 prices) while the (conditional) median about 
£1,400. This yields a national level aggregate for the annual flow of inter vivos gifts 
of about £1.2 billion (or about £1.1 billion if we exclude transfers received by those 
aged 55 and over) which is only around 4 per cent of the £30 billion annual 
inheritance flow (see Karagiannaki, 2011). Note that the 2004/05 Student Income and 
Expenditure Survey (SIES) statistics on parental support received by students 
aggregated by the total number of UK students yields an estimate of parental transfers 
received by UK students of around £1.95 billion which is substantially higher than the 
total BHPS financial transfer estimates (note that SIES estimate would include 
financial transfers to students living with their parents which are explicitly excluded 
from BHPS).
5
 To further assess the coverage of BHPS financial transfers data 
statistics we calculate the proportion of wave 16 BHPS respondents who have 
                                              
5
  The 2004/05 Income and Expenditure Survey covered both full-time and part-time English 
and Welsh-domiciled students at HE institutions and further education (FE) colleges, 
including the Open University (OU). According to this survey English and Welsh domiciled 
full time students on average received about £1,600 in parental support and part time students 
about £130 (for details about the survey see Finch et al. 2006). To derive the aggregate we 
multiply the mean amount of transfers for each group (ft-pt) with the total number of full-time 
and part-time UK domiciled students. According to HESA, Statistical First Release 130,  the 
numbers of full-time and part-time students in 2004 were 1.135 million and 784 thousands 
respectively- HESA statistics accessed at 
http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1356&Itemid=161 
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received a transfer in any year prior to their wave 16 interview and the mean value of 
the sum of their transfers and compare these estimates with those derived from AIS. 
The sample for this comparison is restricted to respondents aged 18-34 who do not 
live with their parents (in accordance to AIS where the majority of respondents are not 
living with their parents). On this cumulative basis the BHPS estimates imply an 
average probability of having received a transfer among adults aged 18-24 of around 
16 per cent and an average per adult transfer across the whole age group of around 
£600. Similarly for the 25-34 age group the estimates imply that about 21 per cent 
would have received a transfer with an average per adult transfers across the whole 
age group of about £1,000. It appears therefore that this part of BHPS captures only 
about half of the receipts captured by AIS.  
 
Data from the ‘social support network’ part of the survey (presented in the left hand 
side of Table 3) show that about 7 per cent of all adults receive financial help from 
their non-resident parents regularly or frequently (or 14 per cent of adults with non-
resident parents). This is apparently much higher than the estimates derived from the 
financial transfers data from the income section (0.9 per cent), but also on a 
cumulative basis substantially higher than the AIS estimates. Referring to our 
discussion above, differences between the two set of questions probably reflect 
differences in coverage of different types of support (for example data from the 
income section probably refer to more regular or larger cash transfers while data from 
the social support network captures more irregular or smaller transfers and probably 
loans). Unfortunately since the ‘social support module’ does not record the amount of 
financial help we cannot assess how these compare to financial transfers data or AIS.  
 
Notwithstanding these differences, both parts of the BHPS show a very similar age 
pattern in the probability of transfer receipt. This age pattern reflects a declining 
probability of receiving cash transfers with age and a corresponding peak for the 
youngest age group (about 5 per cent based on data from the income section and 18 
per cent based on the social support network). No significant pattern is detected in 
terms of the average value of transfers among recipients.  
 
The information in Table 4 views the transfers from the parent’s perspective. The 
statistics in the left hand side of the table are based on the social support network 
modules (included in waves 11 and 16) which records whether respondents provided 
financial help to their non-resident children while those in the right hand side are 
based on the external transfers section which records whether respondents made 
monetary transfers to any non-resident children.
6
 Overall according to data from the 
external transfers section, 6 per cent of households with non-resident children said that 
they were making transfers to their non-resident children, averaged over the year 
1992-2006 (with 2 per cent of households making educational payments). Respective 
                                              
6
  As discussed in the data section respondents had to specify the reason for these transfers 
(possible reasons specified by the survey included: transfers of money for maintenance; 
alimony and child support; educational payment; debt repayment; and other). Transfers for 
maintenance, alimony and child support are excluded from our analysis and reports are 
aggregated at household level.    
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estimates based on the ‘social support’ network module suggest that about 29 per cent 
of households with non-resident children over 18 ‘regularly or frequently’ provided 
financial help to their non-resident children. Again it is not entirely clear why the two 
estimates differ in such an extent, but as discussed in the data section a potential 
reason can be that data on external transfers refer to transfers made in some regular 
basis while the data from the social support network refer to more irregular forms of 
support and probably include loans.  
 
Despite differences in scale a common age pattern again emerges from both sources. 
In particular, both show that the probability of making monetary transfers to non-
resident children increases between the age groups 35-44 and 45-54 and then 
decreases substantially as parents get older (with the peak coinciding with an age 
when children would be young adults and possibly in higher education). This age 
pattern is consistent with findings from other studies which show that inter vivos 
transfers are received in an earlier stage of the one’s lifetime and reach the recipient 
when help is most needed (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Altonji et al., 1996; 
McGarry, 1999; McGarry and Schoeni 1995 and 1997; Schoeni, 1997).  
 
In summary, both AIS and BHPS suggest that inter vivos transfers in the UK are fairly 
common although regular financial transfers may be less so. From a lifetime 
perspective AIS estimates suggest an aggregate value of all gifts of around £83 billion 
(which represents about 2.3 per cent of total marketable wealth in 2003 or around 10 
per cent of the size of inheritances) while BHPS financial transfer data imply an 
annual flow of parental transfers of around £1.1 billion. Adjusting BHPS estimates by 
the factor by which it apparently understates AIS estimates increases the annual flow 
of transfers to £2.2 billion. However, even with this adjustment these estimates should 
probably be still viewed as lower bound estimates of the overall magnitude of parental 
transfers since neither of them fully captures small or irregular payments (of the kind 
that are probably captured by the ‘social support network’ module). Furthermore it 
seems highly unlikely that any of the surveys systematically captures life insurance or 
establishment of trusts which could account a substantial share of lifetime transfers of 
the most wealthy. Although the understatement arising from incomplete coverage of 
small irregular transfers would probably be rather small and insignificant, the 
understatement arising from incomplete coverage of trusts would probably be more 
important.  
 
4.2 Practical support and co-residence    
In this section we provide evidence on the magnitude of two alternative types of 
parental support i.e. parental transfers in the form of practical support to non-resident 
children and support provided in the context of co-residence. To identify children’s 
living arrangements (i.e. whether they live with their parents or not) we rely on 
variables that describe the relationship of each household member to the household 
head. In case that neither the child nor the parent is the household head then we used a 
separate variable which identifies each household member’s mother and father if they 
live in the household. To assess the extent to which children receive practical support 
from their parents we use data from the social support network module of waves 11 
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and 16 which record whether children receive different types of practical support from 
non-resident parents. 
 
Results for each of these two alternative types of support are reported in Table 5. 
Overall, about 10 per cent of all adults aged 18 years or over live with their parents. 
Age patterns reveal substantial declines in the probability of living with parents with 
age. Between the age groups 18-24 and 25-34 the probability of co-residence falls by 
more 45 percentage points (from more than 60 to less than 14 per cent). Receipt of 
practical support from parents is also substantial. Overall according to the statistics 
presented in Table 5 about 19 per cent of respondents receive practical support from 
their non-resident parents regularly or frequently while about 54 per cent of parents 
provided help to at least one of their children with the percentage of parents providing 
support to resident children reaching two-thirds for those aged 45-74. Once again the 
age patterns reveal substantial declines in the probability of receiving support from 
non-resident parents by age (and an equivalent decrease in the probability of giving 
support to non-resident children with the age of the parent).  
 
5. Multivariate analysis of the determinants of parental transfers  
In this section I present estimates for the probability that a child receives a transfer 
and the amount of the transfers based on data from AIS and BHPS. In order to 
examine more closely the correlation between transfers and parental characteristics we 
also estimate models for the probability that a parent makes transfers to their non-
resident children (based on BHPS). Recall that cash transfers in AIS refer to lifetime 
cash transfers (i.e. cash transfers received by the respondents (and their spouses at 
some point up to the survey year) while the BHPS cash transfers data refer to transfers 
made in the year preceding the survey (or regularly as in the ‘social support network’ 
module). Therefore, the two data sources capture different aspects of transfers. Data 
on lifetime receipts capture the correlation between transfers and later outcomes of the 
recipient while data from BHPS capture the correlates of parental giving behaviour i.e. 
how parents of a given background respond to their children’s economic conditions.   
 
5.1 Inter vivos financial transfers   
LIFETIME CASH TRANSFERS BASED ON DATA FROM AIS  
In Table 6 we present marginal effects from a logit model which predicts the 
probability of having received inter vivos transfers as well as estimates of an OLS 
model of the amount of the transfers based on data from AIS. For each of these two 
equations we estimate two specifications. The first specification includes respondents’ 
age, educational attainment and marital status while the second adds controls for 
respondent’s educational attainment. Because we want to abstract from lifecycle 
factors that affect the probability of receiving a transfers (i.e. age differences in 
receipt) and in order to minimize the effect of liquidity constraints and transitory 
variations in income the sample used in our estimation is restricted to respondents 
aged between 35 and 55 years old.  
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The result of the first specification (columns 1 and 3 of Table 6) suggest a rather 
strong positive association between transfers and income. People in the highest 
income category have about 44 percentage points higher probability of having 
received a transfer than those in the lowest income category and the expected amount 
of their transfers is about £8,000 higher than for those in the lowest category shown 
(note that the mean amount is about £3,800). Given the absence of controls of parental 
background the positive association between income and lifetime transfers most 
probably reflect the positive correlation between parental resources with both transfers 
and recipients’ income. In the second specification where we add controls for 
respondents’ educational attainment the association between income and transfers 
falls slightly but there still remains some positive association between transfers and 
gross household income of the respondents. Of course the positive association 
between educational attainment and transfers partly captures parental transfers to 
children’s education (recall that 4.9 per cent of people reported transfers said they 
received transfers for education) but similarly to income it may also capture the effect 
of unmeasured parental resources. Overall, given the lack of controls for parental 
resources, the best way that we can interpret the positive association between 
transfers, and recipients’ income and education is that it reflects the positive 
correlation of parental resources with both transfers and children’s income and 
educational attainment.  
 
CURRENT CASH TRANSFERS   
In this sub-section we present estimated regression results for the probability and the 
amount of parental cash transfers based on data from the two different modules of 
BHPS (i.e. the ‘income section’ and the ‘social support network’ module). Because 
inter vivos transfers in BHPS are measured concurrently with other attributes of the 
parent and the child, the estimates capture more accurately the possible correlates of 
the parental giving behaviour at the time of the transfer. Therefore unlike the AIS 
lifetime cumulative receipts (up to the survey year) the estimated results on the effect 
of children’s characteristics would reflect parents’ responses to current economic 
circumstances of their children.  
 
The specifications I estimate include child’s current income, educational attainment, 
age, sex, marital status as well as an paternal social class when the respondent was 14 
years old. I first, estimate ordinary logit models predicting the probability that a child 
received parental transfer and an ordinary least square model predicting the amount of 
the transfers. Then, I estimate these two models controlling for individual fixed effects 
in order to account for the possibility that there are unobserved differences across 
children that are correlated with transfer behaviour and with some of the right-hand 
side variables.  
 
Table 7 reports marginal effects from the logit models for the probability that a child 
receives a transfer from his/her parents and estimates of an OLS model for the amount 
of this transfer as well as fixed effects specifications of these models (note that the 
sample used in this models include only those BHPS respondents aged between 18-34 
years old who do not live with their parents). The probability models are estimated 
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using data from both the ‘social support network’ and the income section modules 
while the levels models are estimated using data only from the income section. In 
general, although the two modules appear to be capturing different parts of overall 
transfers, the general direction of the results appears very similar.  
 
Probably the most striking difference between the two modules is in the sign and 
significance of the estimates of father’s social class. This is estimated to have a 
positive effect (which however is significant only for upper social classes) in the 
model estimated using the income section data whereas a negative and insignificant 
effect in the social support network module. Again we view differences in the 
estimates to reflect the different nature of the transfers captured by the two set of data 
(the wider forms of support in the ‘social support network’ are less correlated with 
parental resources) as well as the fact that paternal social class when the respondent 
was 14 is a poor proxy of parental resources (as we will show below parental 
resources have strong effects in both modules). The estimates in the second and third 
columns indicate that both the probability and the amount of the transfers are strongly 
negatively related to child’s current income. In the income section results, increasing 
child’s income by £10,000 decreases the probability of receiving a transfer by about 1 
percentage point (relative to a mean sample probability of 4.1 per cent) while it 
decreases the expected amount of the transfer by about £76 (relative to sample mean 
of £110). Similarly, the probability and the expected amount of the transfer fall 
significantly with the age of the children. These results are consistent with the altruism 
and the insurance models wherein parents make transfers when their children are 
liquidity-constrained. Other variables that affect positively the probability of receiving 
an inter vivos transfer are being in full time education, being unemployed and being 
unmarried. Holding current income constant, married people are about 25 per cent less 
likely than their unmarried counterparts to receive a transfer (probably reflecting that 
married couples may be less likely to be liquidity-constrained because they have a 
second potential worker to buffer income shocks (McGarry, 1999)) while unemployed 
people are significantly more likely to receive a transfer than their employed 
counterparts (the estimate on both these variables in the OLS models are 
insignificant). Children in full-time education are 3 percentage points more likely to 
receive a transfer than employed children (and 12 percentage points more likely in the 
models estimated using the ‘social support network’ module) and the amount of their 
transfers is £610 higher. In the models estimated using the income section data the 
estimates on the variables indicating respondents’ educational attainment suggest that 
education is positively associated both with the probability and the amount of the 
transfer. The positive association between educational attainment and transfers may 
reflect that there are other unmeasured parental resources (e.g. parental income and 
wealth) that may be correlated both education and transfers and are not captured by 
father’s social class variable included in our specification. By contrast, the estimated 
coefficient  on highest educational category from the wider kinds of transfers captured 
by the social support network is negative and significant. We view this effect to reflect 
the fact that children with higher educational qualifications are less likely to be in 
need of financial help from their parents (similarly we view differences in the 
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estimated effects between the two sections of BHPS to reflect differences in the nature 
of support captured by the two sources). 
 
In the models estimated controlling for individual fixed effects (second panel of Table 
7) there continues to be a negative relationship between transfers and income but the 
magnitudes of the effects are reduced (and becomes insignificant for the probability of 
receipt). To the extent that there is a positive correlation between income and 
unmeasured ability the drop in the income estimates suggests that there is a negative 
correlation between transfers and unmeasured ability. As in McGarry (2000) we view 
this result to be consistent with a model of transfer behaviour wherein parents make 
larger financial transfers to children with less ability and invest in the schooling of 
more able children (Behrman, Pollak and Taubman, 1982).  
 
In Table 8 we examine inter vivos transfers from the parent’s perspective. In the left 
hand side of the table we report marginal effects from a logit model estimating the 
probability that a parent makes a transfer to at least one of his/her child based on data 
from the ‘social support network’ module while the right hand side reports results 
from a similar model estimated based on the external transfers section. Note that 
despite the fact that the two set of questions have very different coverage of parental 
transfers they give a consistent picture of the correlates of parental giving behaviour. 
Both suggest that parents who are more educated, home owners and have higher 
incomes are more likely to make a transfer. In the ‘social support network’ module the 
estimates suggest that increasing parental income by £10,000 increases the probability 
of making a transfer by about 3 percentage points (or by about 7.5 per cent). An 
equivalent increase in parental income based on the estimates from the external 
transfers data would raise the probability of making a transfer to non-resident children 
by about 2 percentage points (or by about 20 per cent). Holding household income 
constant, married parents are found to be 6 percentage points more likely to provide 
financial help to their children although they do not have any significantly different 
probability of making transfers. In both parts of the BHPS parental education has 
substantial effects (moving from the lowest to the highest educational category 
increase the probability of making a transfer to non-resident children by about 15 
percentage points). As it could be expected in both modules the age of the parent has a 
very strong negative effect on the probability of making a transfer. Again the negative 
relationship between parent’s age and transfers is consistent with the fact that the age 
of the parent is positively correlated with the age of the children and therefore reflects 
the fact that children needs are a decreasing function of age. Observe that the effects 
of most economic variables are substantially stronger in relative terms in the models 
estimated using data from the external transfers section than in the models estimated 
using data from the social support module.  
 
The main conclusion that we can draw from the analysis so far is that inter vivos 
transfers are strongly positively associated with parental resources and negatively 
associated with children’s current income. Holding parental resources constant (as 
proxied here by parental social class) children with lower incomes are more likely to 
receive a transfer. Referring to the results in the previous section the patterns 
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estimated in this section show correlates of parental giving at the time of the transfer 
i.e. show how parents respond to their children’s’ economic circumstances. These 
results contrast to the results from AIS for cumulative lifetime receipts, which show 
the correlation between transfers with children’s income and education at a later time 
than the time of transfer receipt. The latter relationship captures the correlation 
between transfers with later outcomes as well as the effect of parental background 
characteristics.      
 
5.2  Parental practical support  
In this subsection we turn to examine correlates of parental practical support. In the 
first column of Table 9 we report estimates from the equation which predicts the 
probability a child receives practical support from a non-resident parent while the 
second column views practical support from the perspective of the parent showing the 
probability a parent provides practical support to children. The specifications which 
analyse parental support from the child’s point of view includes child’s current 
income (not-including parental financial transfers) as well as educational attainment, 
age sex, marital status and father’s social class when the respondent was 14 years old 
while the specifications which examine practical support from the parents’ point of 
view include parents’ age, educational attainment, current income and marital status. 
Unfortunately in the specification which examines parental practical support from the 
perspective of the parents we cannot control for any of the children’s characteristics.  
 
The estimates from the equation which predicts parental support from the perspective 
of the donor parent suggest that parental income have no significant effect on the 
probability that a parent provides practical support to at his/her child. According to the 
estimates an increase in income by about £10,000 would increase the probability of 
providing practical support to non-resident children by about 0.5 percentage points 
which is a very small increase in terms of magnitude and also insignificant in 
statistical terms. The only parental variables which significantly affect the probability 
of providing practical support to non-resident children is education and marital status. 
According to the estimated effects parents with at least one A-level and those with 
degrees are 7 and 10 percentage points less likely to provide practical support to their 
children than parents with no educational qualifications while married parents are 
about 15 percentage points more likely to provide practical support to their children 
than their unmarried counterparts.  This may reflect the greater costs of time to 
provide practical help for parents with greater earnings potential or who are single, but 
other explanations are possible.  
 
Similarly, the equation which predicts the probability that children receive practical 
support from non-resident parents shows that the recipients’ income has no 
statistically significant effect on the probability of receiving practical support from 
non-resident parents. Two variables with important effects however is the number of 
children in the household as well as the variable which indicate if spouse is working 
both of which have a significant positive effects on the probability of receiving 
practical support from non-resident parents.  
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In summary, the results of this section suggest that practical support is not associated 
with the income of either the recipient or the donor but that is more closely associated 
with needs of the children for practical support. This contrasts with the results for 
financial transfers which are strongly associated with both the recipients’ and donors’ 
incomes. This result is consistent with finding from other studies including Altonji et 
al. (1996) who also find that parental and children’s income have economically and 
statistically insignificant impact on time transfers from parents to their children. 
  
5.3   Co-residence    
Table 10 reports marginal effects from a logit model which predicts the probability 
that an adult child lives with his/her parents. The sample used in the estimation of this 
model is restricted to all people aged 18-34 years old. As expected, the estimated 
results suggest that the probability of living with parents falls significantly with the 
age and the income of the children (indicating that privacy is a normal good). To get 
an idea of the magnitude of the effects note that a £10,000 increase in current income 
decreases the probability of living with parents by about 2 percentage points. Holding 
current income constant more educated people are found to be less likely to live with 
their parents. This negative relationship may reflect unobserved differences across 
children that are correlated with education that are not captured by our model. Finally, 
the estimated effects suggest that there is a significant negative relationship between 
paternal social class and the probability of living with parents. This negative 
relationship most likely reflect the fact that wealthier parents (as proxied by father’s 
social class difference) are more able to substitute financial transfers for co-residence.    
    
6. Conclusions  
In this paper we presented evidence concerning the magnitude and the determinants of 
inter vivos transfers in the UK using data from the Attitudes to Inheritance Survey and 
the British Household Panel Survey. Data from the AIS suggest that overall about 31 
percent of individuals aged over 18 have ever received an inter vivos gift during their 
lifetime and up until the survey year while the average amount of these gifts amounted 
to about £10,000 for recipients. Aggregating these estimates at national level we find 
that the total value of all gifts ever received (valued more £500) amounts to about £83 
billion which is the equivalent of about 2.3 percent of total marketable wealth in 2005, 
or about one tenth of reported accumulated inheritances. 
 
Depending on which information we rely on BHPS provides a very wide range 
estimates of the proportion of individuals that receive financial transfers in each 
particular year. Data from the social support network module imply that about 7 per 
cent of individuals receive financial help regularly or frequently from non-resident 
parents. On the other hand if we rely on financial transfer data from the income 
section we find that only 1 percent of individuals receive financial transfers from non-
resident family members with a mean value of about £2,600. This yields an annual 
flow of parental transfers of around £1.1 billion and corresponds only to around 4 per 
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cent of the annual flow of inheritances
7
. Similar discrepancies exist in the estimates of 
the percentage of parents who make financial transfers to their children. According to 
the external transfers section data about 6 per cent households provide ‘transfers’ to 
their non-resident children while data from the social support network module imply 
that 29 per cent of households provide ‘financial help’ to their non-resident children. 
We view differences across the different parts of BHPS to reflect different forms of 
parental giving. In particular data from the income section appears to be capturing 
more regular payments but (at least not systematically) neither irregular one-off 
payments of the kind included in AIS nor smaller payments of the kind captured by 
the financial help data from the social support network module. Cumulative BHPS 
receipts over the period 1991-2005 suggest that the BHPS transfer data capture only 
about half of those reported to AIS.  If one adjusts in line with this, the annual flow of 
inter vivos transfers would rise to about £2.2 billion (2005 prices).  
 
Despite these differences, the intergenerational transfers data from the various parts of 
BHPS reveal similar patterns for relationship between transfers and the characteristics 
of the donor and the recipient. In particular the results indicate that the probability and 
the amount of the transfers are positively related to parental characteristics (such as 
income, education and social class) and negatively related to recipients’ income. 
These results suggest that parental transfers reach the recipient when needs are more 
acute. Analysis of the association between cumulated inter vivos transfers and the 
characteristics of the recipient using data from AIS suggests that inter vivos transfers 
are positively associated with recipients’ income and education. In the absence of 
controls for parental socio-economic characteristics we view this positive association 
as capturing the positive association between transfers and parental socio-economic 
background.  The latter finding along with the corresponding effects of parental 
background variables from BHPS implies that inter vivos transfers tend to reinforce 
intergenerational links.  
 
Other forms of support such as co-residence and practical support also appear to be 
significant, with about 9 percent of all people aged over 18 living with their parents 
and about 22 per cent receiving practical support from non-resident parents. Unlike 
financial transfers, practical support is not associated with the income of either the 
recipient or the donor. Rather it seems that it reaches the recipient in periods of greater 
needs for practical support.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                              
7
  The estimates on the annual flow of inheritance as derived by Karagiannaki (2011). 
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Table 1: Per cent of individuals who reported they and/or their spouses received 
a lifetime transfer worth £500 or more so far in their lifetime and mean amount 
of lifetime transfers, overall and by age 
 % of respondent 
reported that they or 
their spouses had 
received lifetime 
transfers 
Mean amount received 
conditional on having 
received a transfer 
(total amount of respondent 
and his/her spouse)
1,3
 
Mean amount among all 
individual adults (£)
2,3
 
All  30.6 10,400 1,800 
    
18-24 31.4 4,800 1,300 
25-34 46.6 7,300 2,100 
35-44 40.9 10,500 2,500 
45-54 34.7 14,200 2,700 
55-64 20.4 16,200 1,600 
65-74 11.3 12,200 600 
75+ 6.9 5,900 200 
Note:  
1. Mean amount of transfers was calculated by setting the banded value of transfer to the mid value 
of the band.  
2. The mean amount for all adults have been calculated under the assumption i) that both the 
respondent and his/her souse received a lifetime gift and ii) that the each of them have received 
an equal amount of gifts (i.e. the total amount was divided by two)  
3. All figures are expressed at constant 2005 prices. 
Source: Own analysis of the AIS.  
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Table 2: Per cent of individuals ever received (either them or their spouse) cash 
transfers so far in their lifetime and mean amount of transfers, overall and by 
type of transfers 
 % who 
received 
lifetime 
transfers 
Mean amount of 
total inter-vivos 
transfers by 
whether the 
contained each type 
of gift 
1,2
   
% of respondents who 
received more than 
one type of gift by 
whether received each 
specific type of gift   
Any type of gift   30.6 10,400  
    
Cash to spend   8.3 13,900 50.9 
Buying a car  6.9 12,700 68.4 
Paying for driving lessons   3.1 11,700 92.1 
Wedding or large social 
occasion  
7.6 11,800 68.0 
Buying or maintaining a 
property   
5.9 19,100 67.0 
Birth of a child  3.8 14,900 84.4 
Education  4.9 16,800 80.6 
Business start up  0.7 21,800 61.5 
Paying off debt  2.6 8,300 69.2 
Paying for a holiday  2.9 10,700 67.8 
Other type of gift  3.0 12,100 41.7 
    
Notes:  
1. Mean amount of transfers was calculated by setting the banded value of transfer to the mid value 
of the band.  
2. All figures are expressed at constant 2005 prices. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from AIS. 
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Table 3: Percentage of individuals currently receiving cash transfers (annual rate of receipt and mean amount of receipt) 
 Household finances section
1
  Social support network module
2
 
 Per cent receiving 
financial transfer 
from non-resident 
family members 
Mean amount of 
non-zero  
financial 
transfer3 
 
Median value of non-
zero  financial transfer
3
 
 Per cent 
receiving 
financial help 
from non-
resident parents 
Per cent receiving 
financial help from non-
residing parents (among 
those with non-resident 
living parents) 
Per cent with 
non-resident 
parents (among 
those with 
living parents) 
Overall  0.9 2,600 1,400  7.00 14.5 85.6 
By age         
   18-24 4.8 2,500 1,500  17.5 35.5 51.0 
   25-34 0.9 2,700 1,100  14.0 17.2 86.4 
   35-44 0.5 3,500 1,100  10.2 12.3 95.5 
   45-54 0.4 2,300 1,100  5.2 8.4 95.8 
   55-64 0.3 2,500 1,400  2.2 7.7 94.4 
   65-74 0.3 3,300 2,200  0.1 2.2 94.8 
   75+  0.2 2,300 1,200  0.0 0.00 -  
Obs. 
(weighted) 
140,552 1,885 1,885  16,575 9,079 10,339 
Cumulative receipts for wave 16 respondents aged 18-34  
18-24 16.0 3,800      
25-34  20.5 5,000      
Notes: 
1. The left hand panel of the table is based on BHPS waves 1-16 and the sample includes all respondents aged 18 years old or over (with non-missing 
income data).  
2. The right hand panel of the table is based on BHPS ‘social support network’ module (waves 11 and 16) and the sample includes respondents aged 18 
years old or over.  
3. All figures are expressed at constant 2005 prices  
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Table 4: Percentage of families who make cash transfers to non-resident children, BHPS, ‘social support network’ module 
and the ‘external transfers’ section  
 Social support module
1
  External transfers section
2
 
 % with 
children 
over 18 
 
% with  non-
resident 
children 
(among those 
with children 
over 18)  
% providing 
financial help to non-
residing children  
(among those with 
non-residing children 
over 18) 
 % with 
children 
over 18 
 
% with  non-
resident children 
(among those 
with children 
over 18) 
% making 
external 
transfers to non-
resident children 
(among those 
with non-
residing children 
over 18) 
% making 
educational 
payments 
(among those 
with non-
residing 
children over 
18) 
% any other types of 
payments (among 
those with non-
residing children 
over 18) 
Overall 61.4 88.4 28.5  60.7 89.2 6.0 2.0 5.0 
By age           
   35-44 13.5 50.3 41.4  13.5 61.0 8.4 2.1 7.2 
   45-54 56.2 74.9 45.4  67.8 76.2 14.2 6.3 10.9 
   55-64 82.2 92.3 34.4  85.6 93.6 5.9 1.7 5.0 
   65-74 82.6 97.6 27.6  79.1 98.4 3.0 0.4 2.7 
   75+  85.2 97.4 14.6  81.1 99.3 2.2 0.1 2.2 
No of 
obs.  
6,703 3,853 3,408  55,081 33,449 29, 135 29, 135 29,135 
Note:  
1.  The left hand panel is based on BHPS ‘social support network’ module (waves 11 and 16) and the sample includes all households with heads aged 35 
years old and over.  
2.  The right hand panel of the table is based on BHPS external transfers section (waves 2-16) and the sample includes all households with heads aged 35 
years old and over.  
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Table 5: Per cent co-residing with parents and per cent receiving practical 
support from non-resident parents  
 Co-residence   Practical support  
 Per cent of individuals 
living with parents   
 Per cent of individuals 
receiving practical  
support from non-
resident parents (all) 
Per cent of parents 
providing practical 
support to non-resident 
children (among 
families with non co-
resident children) 
Overall  
 
9.8  19.0 54.0 
By age      
   18-24 60.6  30.0 na 
   25-34 13.3  43.3 na 
   35-44 3.6  36.2 58.2 
   45-54 2.0  13.2 67.2 
   55-64 0.9  2.2 68,6 
   65-74 0.1  0.2 65.2 
   75+  0.0  0.00 25.2 
No. of obs.   140,552  16,575 3,404 
Note: The left hand panel is based on data from waves 1-16 of BHPS while the right hand panel is 
based on BHPS ‘social support network’ module in waves 11 and 16 of the BHPS.  
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Table 6: Logit estimates of the probability of having ever received lifetime gift 
(greater than £500) and OLS model of the total amount of all gifts ever received 
(respondents aged 35-55)    
 Logit estimates of the 
probability of having 
ever received lifetime 
gifts 
 
 
 
OLS estimates of the 
amount of lifetime gift 
      
Age  -0.01* -0.00  -3.25 13.34 
 [0.10] [0.19]  [0.96] [0.84] 
Education (ref. No qualifications) 
   O-level or below   0.07   1192.52 
  [0.25]   [0.27] 
   At least one A-level   0.27***   3699.25*** 
  [0.00]   [0.00] 
   Degree or above   0.22***   4762.74*** 
  [0.00]   [0.00] 
Gross household income (£/week) (ref.<£200 ref) 
   £200-£399 0.12 0.11  1910.42 1702.05 
 [0.12] [0.16]  [0.17] [0.22] 
   £400-£999 0.28*** 0.22***  6115.82*** 4821.50*** 
 [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] 
   >£1,000 0.44*** 0.33***  8118.85*** 5540.28*** 
 [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] 
Constant    522.70 -1668.76 
    [0.88] [0.63] 
N 752 752  701 701 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-sq 0.059 0.084  0.068 0.075 
Log-likelihood  466.5 454.1    
Note: The sample of the analysis includes all AIS respondents aged 35-55 years old. Additional 
variable included but not shown in the table include household size and an indicator for missing 
income. Sample sizes in the logit and OLS models differ due to missing observations on the amount 
of transfer. t-statistics are reported in brackets.  *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 
1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
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Table 7: Effects of child’s characteristics on the probability and amount of 
transfers received by non-resident children aged 18-34 
 Without fixed effects  With fixed effects 
 Social 
support 
module
1
 
Income section
2
  Social 
support 
module
1
 
Income section
2
 
 Probability 
of receiving 
financial 
help 
Probability of 
receiving 
financial 
transfer 
Amount of 
transfer 
 Probability of 
receiving 
financial help 
Probability 
of receiving 
transfer 
Amount of 
transfer 
Age  -0.013*** -0.002*** -4.827***  -0.004 -0.001* -5.086*** 
 [-7.296] [-11.92] [-3.729]  [-1.015] [-1.75] [-2.699] 
Educational attainment (ref. O-level or below)   
  At least one A-level  0.023 0.011*** 72.374***  0.027 0.003 123.849*** 
 [1.302] [6.52] [7.024]  [0.517] [0.50] [4.379] 
  Degree or above  -0.043** 0.028*** 105.312***  -0.023 0.001 -39.720 
 [-2.025] [6.69] [5.515]  [-0.481] [0.21] [-0.870] 
Married  -0.082*** -0.009*** -2.843  -0.019 -0.006  
 [-4.159] [-5.60] [-0.116]  [-0.612] [-1.20] -36.281* 
Labour market status 
(ref. working) 
 0.005**     [-1.875] 
  Unemployed   0.083** [2.17] -20.795  -0.013 0.001 -11.273 
 [1.995]  [-1.299]  [-0.520] [0.23] [-0.411] 
  Disabled   0.043 -0.006* -31.296***  0.950*** -0.010 25.097 
 [0.607] [-1.88] [-2.634]  [15.200] [-1.41] [0.456] 
  Ft student 0.123*** 0.033*** 608.923***  0.056 0.023 421.586*** 
 [2.979] [7.11] [12.785]  [0.546] [1.27] [12.763] 
  Other  0.033 0.006*** -22.983*  0.029 0.006 31.968 
 [1.343] [3.06] [-1.793]  [0.620] [1.01] [1.625] 
Log family income  -0.021*** -0.001*** -84.753***  -0.004 -0.001 -67.725*** 
 [-5.009] [-7.81] [-8.635]  [-0.935] [-1.43] [-16.189] 
Parental social class 
(ref. unskilled) 
       
Partly skilled-skilled 
manual  
-0.048 0.016 24.423*     
 [-1.210] [1.49] [1.940]     
Skilled non manual  -0.059 0.039 20.237     
 [-1.482] [1.27] [1.324]     
Managerial 
professional  
-0.044 0.040* 92.749***     
 [-1.094] [1.71] [5.367]     
Constant   837.689***    734.725*** 
   [10.017]    [12.615] 
N 3,319 33,939 33939  314 3,362 33,939 
R-squared  0.11 0.42 0.098  0.141 0.28 0.086 
Log-likelihood  -1569.3 -3411.2   -93.45 -798.9  
Mean prediction 27.7 4.1 110  8.9 1.6 110 
Note: The models estimated using social support network data includes all Waves 11 and 16 
respondents aged 18-34 years old not living with their parents but with at least one parent alive. The 
models estimated using financial transfers data from the income sections includes all BHPS wave 1-
16 respondents aged 18-34 years old not living with their parents but with at least one parent alive. 
The estimated standard errors in the cross-sectional models are corrected for  repeated observations on 
the same individual. t-statistics are reported in brackets.  *** indicates coefficient statistically 
significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
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Table 8: Logit estimates of the probability of making cash transfers to non-
resident children among families with heads aged 35-64 years old with non-
resident children 
 Social support section  External transfers section 
 Probability of providing 
financial help to non-
resident children 
 
 
 
 
Probability of 
making any type of monetary 
transfers 
    
Age  -0.005**  -0.003*** 
 [-2.549]  [-7.808] 
Educational attainment (ref. O-level or below)   
   At least one A-level  0.047*  0.048*** 
 [1.750]  [5.832] 
   Degree or above  0.144***  0.151*** 
 [3.694]  [7.538] 
Marital status  0.057**  -0.007 
 [2.014]  [-0.923] 
Labour market status (ref. working) 
   Unemployed    -0.061  0.003 
 [-0.729]  [0.238] 
   Disabled  -0.051  -0.037*** 
 [-1.149]  [-4.638] 
   Other  -0.097***  0.001 
 [-3.086]  [0.089] 
Log family income  0.058***  0.038*** 
 [3.861]  [6.862] 
Homeowners  0.062**  0.030*** 
 [1.981]  [4.581] 
N 1759  15368 
Pseudo R-sq   0.048  0.149 
Log-likelihood  -1125.44  -4152.27 
Mean prediction 40.0  9.7 
Note: The first column of the table is based on data from the ‘social support network’ module and the 
sample includes all households (wave 11 and 16) with heads aged 35-64 with non-residing children. 
The second column of the table is based on ‘external transfers’ section waves 2-16 and the sample in 
these models includes all households with heads aged 35-64 which have at least one non-resident 
child over 18 years old. t-statistics are reported in brackets.  *** indicates coefficient statistically 
significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
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Table 9: Logit estimates of the probability of receiving practical support (col. 1) 
and the probability of providing practical support to non-resident children (col. 
2)  
 Receiving practical  
support 
Providing practical 
support 
Age  -0.012*** 0.003 
 [-4.935] [1.483] 
Educational attainment (ref. O-level or below)   
   At least one A-level  0.026 -0.074*** 
 [1.177] [-2.902] 
   Degree or above  -0.124*** -0.104*** 
 [-4.488] [-2.722] 
Married  -0.100*** 0.091*** 
 [-3.463] [3.444] 
Labour market status (ref. working)   
   Unemployed  -0.018 -0.147* 
 [-0.368] [-1.753] 
   Inactive  0.142* -0.029 
 [1.888] [-0.679] 
   Still at school  0.053  
 [1.149]  
   Other  0.079** 0.024 
 [2.454] [0.769] 
Log family income  0.000 0.015 
 [0.001] [1.463] 
Parental social class (ref. unskilled)    
   Partly skilled-skilled manual  0.061  
 [1.085]  
   Skilled non manual  -0.055  
 [-0.859]  
   Managerial professional  -0.004  
 [-0.071]  
Number of children in the household 0.059***  
 [5.649]  
Spouse in working  0.055**  
 [2.109]  
N 3,319 1759 
R-squared  0.041 0.017 
Log-likelihood  -2158.42 -1100.1 
Mean prediction 0.56 0.67 
Note: The first column is based on data from the ‘social support network module’ in waves 11 and 16 
and the sample includes all BHPS respondents aged 18-34 years old with at least one parent not living 
in the household . The second column is based on data from the ‘social support network module’ in 
waves 11 and 16 and the sample includes all households with heads aged 35-64 with non-residing 
children. t-statistics are reported in brackets.  *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 
1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
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Table 10: Logit estimates of the probability of living with parents for all adults 
aged 18-34  
 Logit 
Age  -0.020*** 
 [-28.14] 
Educational attainment (ref. O-level or below)    
   At least one A-level  -0.016*** 
 [-2.75] 
   Degree or above  -0.071*** 
 [-12.58] 
Married  -0.399*** 
 [-39.24] 
Labour market status (ref. working)  
   Unemployed  0.007 
 [0.93] 
   Inactive  0.020 
 [0.86] 
   Still at school  -0.098*** 
 [-22.50] 
   Other  -0.091*** 
 [-19.68] 
Log family income  -0.010*** 
 [-9.85] 
Parental social class (ref. unskilled)   
   Partly skilled-skilled manual  -0.004 
 [-0.21] 
   Skilled non manual  0.000 
 [0.00] 
   Managerial professional  -0.040*** 
 [-2.66] 
N 46,009 
Pseudo R-squared  0.46 
Log-likelihood  -14,280.1 
Mean prediction  0.26 
Note: The sample in this table includes all BHPS respondents aged 18-34 years (waves 1-16) . t-
statistics are reported in brackets.  *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 
at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
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Annex A:  
Questions from the social support network which are used in our analysis  
 
And do you regularly or frequently receive any of the things listed on this card from 
your parents? 
Response options 
Getting lifts in their car (if they have one)    01 
Shopping for you       02 
Providing or cooking meals      03 
Looking after your children     04 
Washing, ironing or cleaning     05 
Dealing with personal affairs eg paying bills, writing letters 06 
Decorating, gardening or house repairs    07 
Financial help        08 
Anything else                                    09 
None of these        10 
 
Nowadays, do you regularly or frequently do any of the things listed on this card for 
your children who are not living here? 
Response options 
Giving them lifts in your car (if you have one)    01 
Shopping for them       02 
Providing or cooking meals      03 
Looking after their children      04 
Washing, ironing or cleaning      05 
Dealing with personal affairs eg paying bills, writing letters 06 
Decorating, gardening or house repairs    07 
Financial help       08 
Anything else (PLEASE SPECIFY)    09 
None of these        10 
 
Questions from the external transfers section  
 
Do you send or give money to any person who does not live here for any of the 
purposes listed on this card? (not including pocket money for children or payments 
to charity) 
 
Purpose of payments listed in the card  
Maintenance/alimony/child support       
Household bills/expenses        
Education/grant  
Spending money/allowance  
Repay loan from person (not bank or finance company)   
Other  
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Respondents who report payment are asked the relationship to the person to whom 
they make the transfer payment.  
 
 
 
